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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the impact of aging on capital accumulation and welfare in a country with a sizable 
unfunded social security system. Using a two-period overlapping-generation model with endogenous 
retirement decisions, we show that both the type of aging and the type of unfunded social security 
system are important in understanding this impact. We consider two demographic changes, declining 
fertility and increasing longevity, and three types of pensions, defined contributions, defined benefits 
and defined annuities, to investigate the differences in implications of aging. 
 
Keywords: aging, public finance sustainability, social security 
 
JEL classification: H2, F42, H8. 
 
                                                           
1 University of Liège, Department of Economics, B-4000 Liège, Belgium. E-mail: Antoine.dedry@icloud.com 
2 International Bank for Reconstruction & Development (IBRD), World Bank Group. 
3 Université catholique de Louvain, CORE, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium; University of Liège, CREPP, B-
4000 Liège, Belgium. E-mail: p.pestieau@ulg.ac.be 
 
 
1 Introduction
Demographic aging poses a major challenge to all industrialized economies and
to a number of developing countries. Driven by two concomitant factors, an ever
increasing longevity and a sharp decline in fertility, aging implies a raise in the
ratio of elderly to the rest of population, the so-called dependency rate. This
transformation is expected to have a number of consequences, which are not always
understood in public discussions. Some consequences are clearly unfavorable such
as the effect of increasing dependency on financial balance of unfunded pensions.
Some others are perceived to be positive: if the decline in fertility outweighs the
increase in longevity we would have a decrease in total population, which may
be welcomed by some on the basis of environmental concerns. Finally, there are
some ambiguous effects. An example is the effect of aging on capital accumulation,
which is one the key factors of growth. Studying the effect of aging on capital
accumulation is particularly difficult when a number of economic dimensions with
substantial age-dependent public presence are included. The most common cases of
such dimensions include national debt, long term care, and unfunded social security.
In this paper, we use a two period overlapping generation model, which enables
us to assess the levels of capital accumulation and welfare in a society subject to two
types of demographic change: a decline in fertility and and increase in longevity.
These two changes lead to aging in the society, defined as an increase in the ratio
of old population to young population. In the absence of a change in policies, aging
can put a substantial stress on the sustainability of public finances.
In comparison to the canonical Diamond’s model, our model will comprise a
number of additonal features that make it more realistic, and can lend itself to
calibration.
• Endogenous age of retirement.
• Pay-as-you go social security that can be either defined benefits, defined con-
tributions or defined annuitites.
The main contribution of this study is to analyze the incidence of these two factors
on the effects of aging on capital accumulation and social welfare. We show that this
incidence depends on the type of social security (funded or not, defined benefits or
defined contributions), and on the way the retirement decision is regulated (optimal
or early retirement).
The aging of the population presents a major challenge for most OECD member
countries. Whether or not the combination of increased longevity and a reduced
2
birth rate will directly reduce the growth rates of these economies by slowing the
growth of the capital stock and by weakening the productivity of the labor force is
an open question. There exist a large number of studies devoted to this question.
Some deal with aging without making the distinction between longevity and fertil-
ity changes; other make that distinction. Some are empirical; others are theoretical
quite often accompanied by calibrated simulations. Some are assuming away pen-
sions and other focus on them. Another distinction is between models of exogenous
versus endogenous growth; in the latter, the way human capital formation adjusts
to aging labor force plays a key role. Relative to this impressive amount of work,
our paper compares different types of social security systems and distinguishes be-
tween longevity increase and fertility decline. In that respect it is at odds with
the existing literature. We cannot survey this literature; we just provide a short
overview.
Among the studies on increased longevity, there is Bloom et al. (2003) who
indicate that this demographic change results in more capital accumulation even if
retirement is endogenous. Echevarria (2002) reaches the same conclusion. Kalemli-
Ozcam et al. (2000) show that the positive effect of mortality decline is made larger
if education adjusts. De la Croix and Licandro (1999) and Zhang et al. (2001, 2003)
argue that the effect of increasing longevity depends on its initial level. For low levels
of life expectancy the effect is positive but it can turn negative for high levels. Note
also the empirical finding of Kinugasa and Mason (2006) who explain the increase
of wealth across countries by the mortality decline.
Turning to studies devoted to fertility, there are the papers by Prettner and
Prskawetz (2010a,b) who point out that a country with a lower fertility rate is able
to sustain higher levels of per capita income than a country with high fertility. The
authors use the framework of an endogenous growth model.
Finally, several papers study the effect of aging on income and growth in a set-
ting of open economies that age at contrasting paces. Bo¨rsch-Supan et al. (2005)
show that that capital flows from fast-aging regions to the rest of the world is ini-
tially substantial but that trends are reversed when households decumulate savings.
They also conclude that closed-economy models of pension reforms miss quantita-
tively important effects of capital mobility. Vogel et al. (2012) analyze the reform
of pensions in an integrated economy. Their main point is that the best way to
cope with aging is through an increase in the retirement age and in human capital
investment.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the basic
model and the main results for an economy that consists of identical individuals
with a defined contribution pension system. Section 3 is devoted to a comparison
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of defined benefits and defined contributions pensions systems. A fourth section
is devoted to the dynamics of this model. As it appears clearly the demographic
shock will differ depending on the type of social security and on the driver of aging.
2 The basic model
We use a standard two-period overlapping generation model. An individual belong-
ing to generation t lives in two periods t and t + 1. The first period of her life has
a unitary length, while the second one has a length ` ≤ 1, where ` reflects variable
longevity. In the first period, the individual works and earns wt which is devoted
to the first-period consumption, ct, saving st and pension contribution τ . In the
second period, she works an amount of time zt+1 ≤ ` ≤ 1 and earns zt+1wt+1. This
earning, the proceeds of saving Rt+1st and the PAYG pension p finances the second
period consumption dt+1. We assume that working in the second period zt+1 implies
a monetary disutility v (zt+1, `), with
∂v
∂z
> 0, ∂
2v
∂`2
> 0 for the existence of a unique
solution, and ∂v
∂`
< 0, which reflects the idea that an increase in longevity fosters
later retirement. Note that, for simplicity, the earnings in the second period of life is
not taxed. Intuitively, the end of the first period can be interpreted as the statutory
age of retirement. We also abstract from modeling the funded social security system
by assuming it is identical to the standard savings. Thus, the pension contribution
parameter τ measures the relative size of the unfunded pensions. In other words,
τ = 0 implies that the whole pension system is funded.
Denoting by u (·) the utility function for consumption c or d and U the lifetime
utility, the problem of an individual of generation t is:
maxUt = u (wt − τ − st) + β`u
(
wt+1zt+1 +Rt+1st + p− v (zt+1, `)
`
)
(1)
where p = τ(1 +n) is the pension benefit in period t+ 1 and β is the time discount
factor. The gross rate of population growth (1 + n) is equivalent to the number of
children per individual in this set up.
The first order conditions for life time utility maximization are simply given by:
v′zt+1 (zt+1, `) = wt+1 (2)
βRt+1u
′
(
d˜t+1
)
− u′ (ct) = 0 (3)
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where d˜t+1 = dt+1 − v(zt+1, `). The first condition (2) shows that the marginal
monetary disutility from second period work needs to be equal to the wage rate
at the optimum. The second condition is the consumption Euler equation, and it
shows that the individual cannot gain further utility by reallocating consumption
between periods. In order to be able to show some of our results analytically, we
will use simple functional forms for u (·) and v(·). Accordingly, we assume that
the period utility function is logarithmic u (x) = ln x, and the monetary disutility
function is quadratic in the main argument v (x) = x2/2γ`. One clearly sees from
the latter functional form that the disutility of working longer can be mitigated by
an increase in longevity. We can now re-write the problem of the individual as the
following maximization of:
Ut = ln (wt − τ − st) + β` ln
(
Rt+1st + z
2/2γ`+ pt
`
)
(4)
where pt = τ(1 + n)
1. The first order condition with respect to zt+1 yields :
zt+1 = z
∗
t+1 = γ`wt+1 (5)
where, ∗ denotes an optimal solution. Using this optimality condition, and
incorporating pt = τ(1 + n), we get an explicit solution for optimal saving rates
from the first order condition with respect to st:
st =
β`
1 + β`
wt − γ`w
2
t+1
2Rt+1 (1 + β`)
− τ
(
β`
1 + β`
+
1 + n
(1 + β`)Rt+1
)
(6)
In many countries, z is not the outcome of a choice without a distortion. Through
an array of programs, workers are induced to retire at ages different from what
they would choose in the absence of these programs. We consider a case where
the workers are induced to retire earlier than they wish to do so, and denote this
induced early retirement by z¯2. In the case of early retirement, we rewrite equations
1As seen below, this implies defined contributions.
2An alternative specification could be that second period labor is subject to a proportional tax
θ whose proceeds are returned to the old workers. Their problem would be to choose z such as to
maximize :
wz(1− θ) + T − v(z, `).
With T = θwz and v = z2/2γ`, this yields
z = γ`w(1− θ)
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(5) and (6) as follows :
zt+1 = z¯
st =
β`
1 + β`
wt − z¯
Rt+1 (1 + β`)
(wt+1 − z¯/2γ`)− τ
(
β`
1 + β`
+
1 + n
(1 + β`)Rt+1
)
(7)
Production side of the economy is characterized by a Cobb-Douglas production
function:
Yt = F (Kt, Nt) = AK
α
t N
1−α
t (8)
where K is the stock of capital, A is a productivity parameter, and N is the labor
force. We distinguish Nt the labor force and Lt the size of generation t. The labor
force comprises the young population of generation t and the labor force partici-
pation from the old generation t − 1. Incorporating the population growth, Lt =
Lt−1 (1 + n), the labor force can be written as Nt = Lt+Lt−1zt = Lt−1 (1 + n+ zt).
In comparison, total population at time t is :
Lt + `Lt−1 = Lt−1 (1 + `+ n) .
Denoting Kt/Nt ≡ kt and Yt/Nt ≡ yt, we obtain the income per worker (and not
per capita):
yt = f (kt) = Ak
α
t
Factors of production are paid according to their marginal contributions :
Rt = f
′ (kt) = Aαkα−1t (9)
wt = f (kt)− f ′(kt)kt = (1− α)Akαt (10)
In the case of optimal distortionless retirement,
z = z∗ = γ`w
In the case of induced early retirement,
z = z¯ = γ`w(1− θ)
where θ is chosen such as to generate z¯ < z∗.
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while the equilibrium conditions in the labor and capital markets are as follows:
Nt = Lt−1 (1 + n+ zt) (11)
Kt+1 = Ltst (12)
where the latter expression reflects the fact that the capital is assumed to be de-
preciated completely after each period. Although, this assumption arises from con-
venience, it is not unrealistic considering the fact that a period denotes several
decades in calendar. Using the optimality condition for savings derived before, the
latter expression can be rewritten as follows :
Gt ≡ (1 + n+ zt+1) kt+1 − β`
1 + β`
A(1− α)kαt + τ
(
β`
1 + β`
+
(1 + n) k1−αt+1
Aα (1 + β`)
)
+
zt+1k
1−α
t+1
(1 + β`)Aα
(
A(1− α)kαt+1 −
zt+1
2γ`
)
= 0
(13)
which defines the dynamic behavior of capital stock explicitly. The standard (Dia-
mond) case with no social security and work in second period of life can be deduced
by shutting down the correponding sections, z = τ = 0, which generates the follow-
ing:
Gt ≡ (1 + n+ zt+1) kt+1 − β`
1 + β`
A(1− α)kαt (14)
Comparing (13) and (14) we have two main differences :
• The third term on the right hand side of (13) denotes the double burden that
the PAYG imposes to saving.
• The fourth term reflects the double effect of working in the second period: a
distortionary effect if z is not optimal and a saving inducement if z < z∗.
In equations (6) and (7) we assumed a pension system that relies on a defined
contribution (DC) formula in which the tax τ¯ is given and thus the benefits p
has to follow through based on demographic shifts. Two alternative systems can
also be considered.The first one provides a defined benefit (DB) p¯ over the second
period: the contribution rate is then endogenous. The other is a scheme which
offers constant annuities a¯ (DA) during retirement. The three revenue constraints
that these systems imply are as follows:
DC : τ¯(1 + n) = p
DB : τ(1 + n) = p¯
DA : a¯(`− z) = τ(1 + n),
7
Table 1: 6 types of social security regimes
DC DB DC
z = z¯ < z∗ 1 2 3
z∗ 4 5 6
z∗ = γ`w.
where an upper bar denotes the defined variable, a¯ is the defined annuity and τ
has to adjust to variations in z, ` and n in this case. Note that for each type of
pension system, the individual utility has to adjust accordingly. We have thus two
characteristics for a social security system : is it DB, DC, DA and does it comprises
an early age or optimal age of retirement ? Altogether, these two characteristics,
with three and two alternatives in each, respectively, provide six different ways
to describe the equation (13). The six cases are presented on Table 1, and the
corresponding equations for Git are provided in appendix.
Using these six alternative specifications, we now turn to the comparative statics
of the problem. But before let us state that we assume that the dynamics of capital
accumulation (eq(13)) lead to a unique and stable equilibrium, which implies that
0 < ∂kt+1
∂kt
< 1. This condition implies that in the steady state Gk =
∂G
∂k
> 0.
3 Comparative Statics
In this section, we investigate the comparative statics for the six alternative cases
of social security systems identified in the previous section. Our main aim is to
elaborate on the behavior of capital accumulation when the economy experiences
aging due to lower fertility or higher longevity. We begin by showing the impact of
a decrease in fertility in an early retirement system:
∆
∂k1
∂n
= −k − τ¯ k
1−α
Aα(1 + β`)
< 0 (15)
∆
∂k2
∂n
= −k + p¯β`
(1 + β`)(1 + n)2
≷ 0 (16)
∆
∂k3
∂n
= −k + a¯(`− z)β`
(1 + β`)(1 + n)2
≷ 0 (17)
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where ∆ =
(
∂G
∂k
)−1
> 0, and superscripts denote the type of social security as
defined in Table 1. In a standard case (Diamond), an increase in fertility has a
depressive effect on capital accumulation in the absence of a PAYG pension system.
This is shown by the first term on the right hand side of each equation above. This
depressive effect is reinforced with a DC pension system as shown by the negative
second term in (15), but it is weakened or possibly reversed with DB or DA pensions
as shown by positive second terms in (16) and (17).
Next, we turn to the impact of an increase in longevity on equilibrium capital
per worker in an induced early retirement system:
∆
∂k1
∂`
=
1
(1 + β`)2
[Akα(1− α)β − βτ¯
(
1− k
1−α(1 + n)
Aα
)
(18)
− z¯k
1−α
2Aαγ`2
(z¯(1 + 2β`)− 2γβAkα`2(1− α))] ≷ 0
∆
∂k2
∂`
=
1
(1 + β`)2
[Akα(1− α)β − βp¯
(
1
1 + n
− k
1−α
Aα
)
(19)
− z¯k
1−α
2Aαγ`2
(z¯(1 + 2β`)− 2γβAkα`2(1− α))] ≷ 0
∆
∂k3
∂`
=
1
(1 + β`)2
(20)
[Akα(1− α)β − a¯
(
β(`− z¯)
(
1
1 + n
− k
1−α
Aα
)
+ (1 + β`)
(
k1−α
Aα
+
β`
1 + n
))
− z¯k
1−α
2Aαγ`2
(z¯(1 + 2β`)− 2γβAkα`2(1− α))] ≷ 0
A small increase in longevity has a fostering effect on capital accumulation in
the absence of pension and work in the second period. When these features are
introduced, however, this effect is diminished and could even be reversed, especially
in the case of defined annuities. An increase in longevity magnifies the cost of
mandatory retirement and the cost of the pension system in all cases.
We now relax the early retirement assumption, and analyze the impact of aging
on capital accumulation when retirement is chosen optimally. The analysis here
shows that, compared to the case with early retirement, the ability to adjust the
retirement age optimally leads to less distortion in equilibrium, but it also diminishes
9
the incentives for saving.
∆
∂k4
∂n
= −k − τ¯ k
1−α
Aα(1 + β`)
< 0 (21)
∆
∂k5
∂n
= −k + p¯β`
(1 + β`)(1 + n)2
≷ 0 (22)
∆
∂k6
∂n
= −k + a¯β`
2(1− γD)
(1 + β`)(1 + n)2
≷ 0 (23)
Similar to the case with early retirement, the PAYG pension system reinforces
the depressive effect of an increase in fertility on capital accumulation in the DC
case and weakens or possibly reverses it in the DB or DA cases. Turning to the
effect of longevity when z is endogeneous, we have:
∆
∂k4
∂`
=
1
(1 + β`)2
[Akα(1− α)β − βτ¯
(
1− k
1−α(1 + n)
Aα
)
(24)
− Ak
1+α(1− α)γ
2α
(2α(1 + β`)2 + (1− α))] ≷ 0
∆
∂k5
∂`
=
1
(1 + β`)2
[Akα(1− α)β − βp¯
(
1
1 + n
− k
1−α
Aα
)
(25)
− Ak
1+α(1− α)γ
2α
(2α(1 + β`)2 + (1− α))] ≷ 0
∆
∂k6
∂`
=
1
(1 + β`)2
[Akα(1− α)β −Dkγ
(
(1 + β`)2 +
a¯
2Aαkα
+
(1− α)
2α
)
(26)
− a¯(1−Dγ)
((
k1−α
Aα
+
β`
1 + n
)
+ β`
(1 + β`)
1 + n
)
]
(27)
where D = (A(1− α)kα − a¯) > 0. These equations show that both pension and
retirement terms weaken the positive effect of an increase in ` on equilibrium value
of k for the three types of pensions systems.
The analysis so far has shown that demographic change has different implica-
tions for capital accumulation under alternative PAYG systems. Analytically, these
results are sufficient to show that the impacts are different quantitatively. In order
to better grasp these effects, we employ a numerical example. To this effect, we use
a set of parameter values to characterize the initial steady state. They are described
in the following table.
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A = 10 α = 0.33 γ = 0.05 z¯ = 0.05
β = 0.25 n = 0.2 ` = 0.6 τ = 1
Using these values we simulate the equilibrium profils for the agent’s lifetime
utility U and and the capital per worker k with different values of fertility n and
longevity `. We present these profiles in the figures below.
Our numerical illustration indicates that in most cases the incidence of aging
has the same sign as without pension or activity in the second period.
However, there are exceptions. Let us consider the early retirement case illustrated
in Figure 1. An increase in fertility may have a positive effect on utility for low
rates of fertility in case of defined benefits or defined annuities. This means that
the decline in capital accumulation is more than offset by the fact that the pension
burden is alleviated by an increase in fertility. As to longevity increase, we see that
in the case of DA it can have a depressive effect on welfare when longevity is high
enough. The reason is to be found in the fact that the age of retirement increases
as well, which induces a loss in utility . Turning to the case of optimal retirement,
we again find that utility increases as n increases under DB or DA regimes. When
longevity increases and social security is of the DA type, utility decreases for high
levels of longevity. People living longer implies more disutility of work and less
consumption in the second period.
4 Dynamics
We now focus on the dynamic analysis of the problem. We are particularly interested
by the gains (if any) in capital accumulation and in utility resulting from aging and
by the cases where the transition can be welfare worsening for some generations. In
other words, we investigate if there are any cases where the short term impact of
demographic shift contradicts the long term implications.
The simulations in this section use the same parameter values as in the static
simulations in the previous section. However, in this case, we need to specify the
magnitude of demographic transition between two steady states as a single value.
In order to make comparable the changes in n and `, we assume that a fertility
driven aging emerges from a decrease in n from 0.2 to 0.1, and a longevity driven
aging arises from an increase in ` from 0.8 to 0.873. Both changes imply the same
magnitude of aging measured by the increase in the rate of dependency `
1+n
, (about
9 percent increase from the initial steady state dependency ratio), and both changes
11
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are anticipated by the agents. These demographic shocks leads to new equilibriums
over time. Table 2 presents the changes in the steady values of capital per worker
and lifetime utility in percentage terms. Both types of aging have the most positive
impact on capital accumulation and lifetime utility under a defined contribution
system. The least positive impact, or the most negative in the case of fertility
shock, alternates between defined benefits and defined annuities depending on the
type of aging.
The transition dynamics for these shocks are illustrated by the Figures 4 and 5,
where a permanent demographic shock is introduced in period 6.
Table 2: Comparative Statics for Capital per Worker and Lifetime Utility under
Different Social Security Systems and Shock Scenarios
(Percentage Change in the Steady State Values after the Shock)
The most striking result is the transitory loss in utility following a fertility shock,
particularly with DC. This is due to substantial loss in old age consumption when
the shock hits. Intuitively, a lower fertility in period 6 reduces the retirement ben-
efits for the old generation within the same period under the defined contributions
system. Anticipating this reduction, the generation that is born in period 5 in-
creases the savings as implied by the Euler equation. In equilibrium, this increase
in savings joins the reduction in the labor force to increase the real wages in period
6, however this increase is not sufficient to fully compensate the decrease in retire-
ment benefits. As a result, the generation that is born in period 5, who constitute
the old generation when the demographic shock hits in period 6, experiences a loss
in lifetime utility. This transitory cost does not appear in the case of an aging
driven by increasing longevity.
From Table 2 and Figures 4 and 5, it appears that the defined contribution
formula dominates the other formulas both in capital increase and utility gain as
15
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a response to aging in the steady state. Induced early retirement seems also to
dominate flexible retirement meaning that the labor distortion is more than offset
by the gain in capital accumulation.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have tried to evaluate the implications of different sources of aging
on both the level of capital and of welfare of economies having social security systems
that can differ in three ways: defined benefits or contributions, funded or not, early
retirement or flexible retirement. We show that the effects of longevity increase and
fertility decrease, two phenomena that contribute to aging, vary in a contrasted way
depending on these features of the pension system. This is important as we know
that countries do not age the same way and that they tend to shift progressively
from a regime of defined benefits towards one of defined contributions. On our
further research agenda, we intend to look at the joint effect of aging and changes
in the social security regimes: from DA/DB to DC and from early retirement to
flexible retirement. Another limitation of the the current analysis is that individuals
are all identical. With heterogeneity in wages, one would find more merits in the
defined annuity formula.
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Appendix
G1t ≡ (1 + n+ zt+1) kt+1 − β`
1 + β`
A(1− α)kαt +
τ¯
1 + β`
(
β`+
(1 + n)k1−αt+1
Aα
)
(28)
+
zt+1k
1−α
t+1
(1 + β`)Aα
(
A(1− α)kαt+1 −
zt+1
2γ`
)
= 0
(29)
G2t ≡ (1 + n+ zt+1) kt+1 − β`
1 + β`
A(1− α)kαt +
p¯
1 + β`
(
β`
(1 + n)
+
k1−αt+1
Aα
)
+
zt+1k
1−α
t+1
(1 + β`)Aα
(
A(1− α)kαt+1 −
zt+1
2γ`
)
= 0
(30)
G3t ≡ (1 + n+ zt+1) kt+1 − β`
1 + β`
A(1− α)kαt +
a¯(`− z¯)
1 + β`
(
β`
(1 + n)
+
k1−αt+1
Aα
)
+
zt+1k
1−α
t+1
(1 + β`)Aα
(
A(1− α)kαt+1 −
zt+1
2γ`
)
= 0
(31)
G4t ≡ (1 + n+ A(1− α)kαγ`) kt+1 − β`
1 + β`
A(1− α)kαt
+
τ¯
1 + β`
(
β`+
(1 + n)k1−αt+1
Aα
)
+
A2(1− α)2γ`k1+αt+1
2 (1 + β`)Aα
= 0
(32)
G5t ≡ (1 + n+ A(1− α)kαγ`) kt+1 − β`
1 + β`
A(1− α)kαt
+
p¯
1 + β`
(
β`
(1 + n)
+
k1−αt+1
Aα
)
+
A2(1− α)2γ`k1+αt+1
2 (1 + β`)Aα
= 0
(33)
G6t ≡ (1 + n+Dtγ`) kt+1 − β`
1 + β`
A(1− α)kαt +
a¯(`−Dtγ`)
1 + β`
(
β`
(1 + n)
+
k1−αt+1
Aα
)
+
Dtγ`k
1−α
t+1
(1 + β`)Aα
(
A(1− α)kαt+1 −
Dt
2
)
= 0
Where Dt = (A(1− α)kαt − a¯)
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